The Anatomy of a Ransomware Attack on CI/CD Pipelines

Introduction

CI/CD pipelines have become the backbone of modern software delivery. They automate building, testing, and deploying code — meaning if the pipeline stops, the business stops. This makes them a goldmine for attackers, especially ransomware gangs who have shifted focus from personal devices to enterprise DevOps environments.

In early 2025, several security researchers noted a rise in ransomware campaigns that specifically targeted build systems and deployment pipelines. These attacks weren’t just about encrypting data — they disrupted releases, poisoned artifacts, and in some cases, even leaked sensitive code repositories to pressure companies into paying ransoms.

So, what does a ransomware attack on a CI/CD pipeline really look like? Let’s break it down step by step.

Step 1: Initial Access

Attackers need a way in, and pipelines provide multiple entry points:

• Exposed CI/CD servers (like Jenkins, GitLab CI, GitHub Actions misconfigs)
• Compromised developer credentials through phishing or token theft
• Unpatched build agents/runners with known vulnerabilities

    Example: In 2025, a research study highlighted how misconfigured self-hosted GitHub runners could be abused to run arbitrary code inside enterprise pipelines.

Step 2: Establishing Persistence

Once inside, attackers ensure they won’t get kicked out quickly:

• Creating rogue service accounts in the pipeline environment
• Planting malicious plugins or scripts that restart on every build
• Abusing insecure secrets storage (like environment variables with plain-text API keys)

This persistence means the attacker can come back even after a security team resets accounts.

Step 3: Payload Delivery (Encrypting or Poisoning Builds)

Unlike traditional ransomware that just encrypts files, pipeline-focused ransomware has two powerful attack vectors:

1. Encrypting build artifacts and source repos → halting all software releases until ransom is paid.
2. Poisoning dependencies or images → inserting backdoors into software that eventually ships to customers.

     This is what makes it scary — a poisoned artifact can create a mass supply chain attack, like the infamous SolarWinds incident but with ransomware pressure on top.

Step 4: Impact and Ransom Demand

The consequences are severe:

• Release freeze: No new features, bug fixes, or patches can go out.
• Customer trust damage: Users doubt the integrity of shipped code.
• Financial loss: Downtime plus potential ransom (often in crypto) can cost millions.
• Regulatory risk: Exposed data may trigger GDPR or CCPA fines.

Attackers often contact victims directly, demanding payment to “unlock” build artifacts or prevent leaked data from being sold on dark web forums.

Defence: How DevSecOps Can Respond

Stopping ransomware in pipelines requires a layered defence strategy:

1. Zero Trust Access
• Enforce MFA on all developer and admin accounts.
• Rotate and vault secrets instead of storing them in plain text.
2. Harden CI/CD Infrastructure
• Patch Jenkins, GitLab CI, GitHub Actions runners regularly.
• Restrict network access to build servers (no direct internet unless absolutely necessary).
3. Artifact Integrity & Signing
• Use signed containers, binaries, and packages to verify authenticity.
• Implement SBOMs (Software Bill of Materials) to detect tampered dependencies.
4. Incident Response Preparedness
• Have immutable backups of repos and build artifacts.
• Run “ransomware drills” in the pipeline just like disaster recovery tests.
5. Continuous Monitoring
• Monitor unusual build behaviour (like massive file encryption or suspicious scripts).
• Integrate SIEM/SOAR with pipeline logs for real-time alerts.

Conclusion

Ransomware in CI/CD pipelines is more than just a security issue — it’s a business continuity crisis. When pipelines go down, everything from feature rollouts to security patches grinds to a halt.

For DevSecOps teams, the message is clear: pipelines are now a prime battlefield, and security must be built in from the ground up. By adopting Zero Trust principles, hardening infrastructure, and monitoring for anomalies, organizations can turn CI/CD pipelines from easy targets into hardened, resilient systems.

In the age of ransomware, prevention isn’t optional — it’s survival.